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Abstract
This paper implements a method to identify and estimate treatment e®ects
in a dynamic setting where treatments may occur at any point in time. By
relating the standard matching approach to the timing-of-events approach,
it demonstrates that e®ects of the treatment on the treated at a given date
can be identi¯ed even though non-treated may be treated later in time. The
approach builds on a \no anticipation" assumption and the assumption of
conditional independence between the duration until treatment and the
counterfactual durations until exit. To illustrate the approach, the paper
studies the e®ect of training for unemployed workers in France, using a rich
register data set. Training has little impact on unemployment duration.
The contamination of the standard matching estimator due to later entries
into treatment is large if the treatment probability is high.
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11 Introduction
Active labor market policy (ALMP) programs for the unemployed include job
search assistance, training, and subsidized work (see Carcillo and Grubb, 2006,
for a recent overview). A typical feature of ALMP is that participation is not
instantaneous upon in°ow into unemployment. Instead, individuals are observed
to enter ALMP programs at any possible elapsed unemployment duration even
though participation is not prohibited by formal entitlement restrictions. This
re°ects the assignment process. Case workers are reluctant to assign workers
too early, because many of them re-enter employment relatively fast anyway.
The starting date of a training program may depend on whether a su±cient
number of potential trainees is available. Likewise, this date may be delayed by
quantity constraints. The availability of subsidized work depends on the inherent
randomness in the moment at which vacancies are created. More in general, the
e®ort levels of the unemployed worker and his case worker may display random
°uctuations over time.
The variation in the timing of program participation (or, shortly, the treat-
ment date) means that those who are not treated at a given elapsed unemploy-
ment duration, say ts, may be treated later. As has been recognized in the
literature (see e.g. Fredriksson and Johansson, 2008), this has as a methodologi-
cal implication that the di®erence between the residual unemployment durations
of the treated at ts and the non-treated at ts partly re°ects the e®ect of later
treatments for those who are not yet treated at ts. Application of standard
evaluation methods like matching may then lead to biased outcomes. This is
unfortunate in the light of the attractive other features of matching as an evalu-
ation method for average reatment e®ects. In particular, under the assumption
of unconfoundedness (CIA) of potential outcomes and assigned treatment con-
ditional on covariates, matching is well-equipped for evaluation in the presence
of e®ect heterogeneity. Notice that the methodological complication cannot be
solved by discarding outcomes of non-treated who are observed to be treated later
and retaining outcomes of non-treated who are observed not to be treated before
they exit unemployment. After all, such an approach produces samples that are
selective in terms of the outcomes.
Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) deal with this by developing a matching
estimator for average e®ects of treatment at ts on the remaining unemployment
duration. For given ts, this estimator compares outcomes for the treated and
2not-yet treated at ts, where the outcomes of the latter are only used insofar as
they remain not-yet treated. See also De Luna and Johansson (2007)'s estimator.
In this paper we clarify and advance on the literature. We develop an eval-
uation framework with counterfactual duration outcomes µ a la Abbring and Van
den Berg (2003). By assuming that the dynamic assignment process is driven by
a single index, it follows that the propensity score is captured by the systematic
(single-index) part of the hazard rate of the duration until treatment. This can
be conveniently estimated. Next, average treatment e®ects can be estimated with
matching, given unconfoundedness and the no-anticipation assumption. The es-
timator is similar to the Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) estimator, but we also
relate it to Abbring and Van den Berg (2003)'s Timing-of-Events framework for
dynamic treatment assignment and duration outcomes. Standard errors for aver-
age e®ect estimates based on kernel matching or inverse probability weighting are
obtained by bootstrapping (see Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1998, and Hirano,
Imbens and Ridder, 2003).
We apply our estimator to study the e®ect of participation in a training
program on the unemployment duration distribution in France. The data are
informative on individual past labor market outcomes including past ALMP par-
ticipation. We estimate average e®ects and we analyze the contamination bias of
the standard approach.
Although the paper is written as dealing with ALMP evaluation, it is clear
that our methodological approach is not tied to that. Also, alternative meth-
ods are available. One may estimate semi-parametric models for outcomes and
treatments at various points in time, to obtain estimates of the treatment e®ect
as a function of the time elapsed since enrollment, the elapsed unemployment
duration, and unobserved-heterogeneity indicators (see Richardson and Van den
Berg, 2008). Yet another approach is to apply sequential CIA at each point of
time conditional on events that took place earlier (Lechner and Miquel, 2005).
2 Identi¯cation of dynamic treatment e®ects
2.1 The model
Consider individuals who enter a given state U (say unemployment) at date 0.
Let Tu be the duration spent in U. Assume that a treatment is available at a
random date Ts. We are interested in e®ects of receiving the treatment at date ts.
3We therefore consider the potential durations Tu(ts) spent in U when treatment
occurs at the assigned date ts.1 In our framework Ts is a latent variable as it can
be censored by Tu. To keep the analysis simple, we take time as discrete.
If an individual leaves at date t without having been treated, his duration
could have been ruled by a process Tu(t0) where t0 > t. To proceed, we adopt the
\no anticipation" assumption from Abbring and Van den Berg (2003)'s Timing-
of-Events approach:
P (Tu(t
0) = t) = P (Tu(t
00) = t); 8t < min(t
0;t
00): (A1)
This assumption means that for each given individual, all counterfactual pro-
cesses have the same distribution up to the ¯rst treatment date among them. In
particular,
P (Tu(1) = t) = P (Tu(t
0) = t); 8t < t
0: (1)
Tu(1) can be viewed as the duration if the individual's treatment will always be
\later". This duration is the counterfactual corresponding to \no treatment".
By analogy to the matching literature, we aim to identify and estimate the
average e®ect ATT of treatment at ts on the treated, with re-employment between
ts and ¿ + ts as the outcome of interest,
TTG¿(ts) = E
£
G¿ (Tu(ts)) ¡ G¿ (Tu(1))
¯
¯Ts = ts;Tu(ts) > ts
¤
: (2)
with G¿(t) = 1ft > ¿ + tsg, for any ¿ > 0.
This deviates in a number of ways from the Timing-of-Events approach. In
the latter, the interest is in (average) treatment e®ects on the counterfactual
distributions, which are de¯ned regardless of the actual assignment mechanism.
Secondly, in the latter approach, the primary interest is in e®ects on individual
hazard rates rather than survival probabilities. Thirdly, the Timing-of-Events
approach provides a comprehensive set of estimates for e®ects at all ts, at the
expense of semi-parametric assumptions, whereas in the matching approach the
ATT estimates at di®erent ts concern sub-populations that are systematically dif-
ferent from each other. This is due to the dynamic selection driven by unobserved
heterogeneity in treatment e®ects, and applies even in the case of randomized as-
signment.2
1We assume that treatment is instantaneous and do not model the duration in treatment.
2Note that, since TT involves survival functions, its sign leads to a reverse interpretation
than usual. If TT is positive, treatment at date ts decreases the probability of leaving before
ts+¿. If the treatment concerns training, then a positive TT parameter indicates that training
tends to lengthen unemployment.
42.2 Identi¯cation
The TT expression involves two quantities. The ¯rst one is the average outcome





¯Ts = ts;Tu(ts) > ts
¤
(3)
This is identi¯ed from outcomes of those observed to be treated at ts. If durations
can be right-censored then we need an additional assumption (see below).





¯Ts = ts;Tu(ts) > ts
¤
: (4)
Its identi¯cation gives rise to the standard issue that the counterfactual is not
observed for the treated. We adapt the approach found in most of the matching
literature and assume that conditional on observed individual characteristics X,
assignment to treatment is independent of the counterfactual. Speci¯cally, in line
with Abbring and Van den Berg (2003), unconfoundedness is assumed through
conditional independence of the latent variable Ts from the joint counterfactuals
fTu(ts)g,
fTu(ts);ts ¸ 0g ? Ts j X: (A2)
The two assumptions (A1) and (A2) allow us to identify the missing term (4),
in two steps. First, assumption (A2) suggests to consider individuals who are at











¯Ts > ts;Tu(ts) > ts;X
¤
:
Then, for individuals in the control group, we e®ectively observe Tu(1) if
individuals leave U before entering treatment, or we observe Tu(1) censored by
Ts if individuals enter treatment before leaving U. The important point is that
because of assumption (A2), conditionally on X, this censoring is independent
from Tu(1). This information is su±cient to identify the distribution of Tu(1)
and therefore the ATT.
The duration in state U may be right-censored. For example, if U is unem-
ployment, censoring occurs if the spells exceed the date up to which information
has been collected. To deal with this issue, we make another conditional indepen-
dence assumption. With TC denoting the durations before censoring, we assume
that:
TC ? (fTu(ts)g;Ts) j X; 8ts: (A3)
5Under this assumption, the distribution of Tu(ts) conditional on being treated
at date ts and X is still identi¯ed. Therefore, the two terms of TT are both
identi¯ed as well. Note that Assumption A3 is stronger than the usual assumption
on right-censoring in duration analysis, which does not require independence but
merely uninformativeness.
2.3 Estimation
We present a simple two-stage method to estimate our parameters of interest. In
policy evaluations with standard matching, it is well known that the dimension-
ality of X can be reduced by the propensity score property (cf. Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983). This can be extended to the case of multi-valued treatments, as
follows:3 assuming that there is an index s(X) such that fTsjX(t) = f(t;s(X)).
Then the unconfoundedness assumption (A2) implies independence conditional
on s(X) as well. In the ¯rst estimation step we estimate the propensity score.
Note that the duration up to treatment is observed for individuals entering treat-
ment and is censored for individuals leaving unemployment before treatment.
Next, we proceed to the matching step. For a given treatment date ts, the
treatment group consists of individuals still unemployed and entering treatment
at ts. The potential control group consists of individuals still unemployed at
this date but not yet treated. We match individuals on the score s(X). Initial
populations of treated and non-treated can be split into subpopulations with sim-
ilar values of the score.4 We depart from the matching literature (e.g. Sianesi,
2004) and use blocking methods (see Cochran, 1968, or Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983). This choice is driven by practical considerations (it allows for computa-
tionally fast estimation) and seems reasonable in the light of the large sample
sizes we have. In each cell, the hazard function ht of the residual duration in
state U is estimated. It is simply computed as the number of individuals leav-
ing unemployment at t (with non censored duration) divided by the number of
unemployed still at risk at this date.5 That is, individuals still unemployed at t
for the control group and individuals still unemployed at t but not yet treated for
the control group. From the hazard function we obtain the survival function as
3See Cr¶ epon and Desplatz (2003) and Hirano and Imbens (2004).
4For example, we may consider the population de¯ned by the percentiles of the distribution
of the score in the treated population.
5With propensity score matching, we have to strengthen (A3) and assume that
TC?Tu(ts)jTs;X.
6(1 ¡ hts) £ (1 ¡ hts+1) £ ¢¢¢ £ (1 ¡ hts+¿). The di®erence between the survival
functions of treated and non-treated is averaged using the distribution of the
score function in the treatment population.
3 An empirical illustration concerning active la-
bor market policies in France.
3.1 Data and speci¯cations
We apply our method to the evaluation of training programs for unemployed
workers in France. See Cr¶ epon, Ferracci and Fougµ ere (2007) for a description
of the French unemployment insurance and training systems. We consider as
treatment any ¯rst entry into any training program, and we are interested in the
e®ect of this treatment on unemployment duration.
We use data from the Fichier National des Assedic (FNA) which is the national
register of all unemployed workers in France since 1990. Each quarter, a random
2.5% sample is drawn from this register. Our data set consists of the four draws
made in 2007. We observe all the unemployed spells of each individual in our
sample from 1990 to March 2007. For the analysis, we consider all unemployment
spells starting between 2002 and 2004. We start only in 2002 because of a major
reform which took place in Autumn 2001. We do not consider spells starting in
January 2005 and after because we want to limit the exogenous censoring due to
the draw date. We end up with 201 277 spells, 6.4% of which have not ended in
March 2007 and are thus censored.
We include a rich set of covariates in the X vector to ensure that the un-
confoundedness assumption (A2) holds. These are the following: age, gender,
occupation of the previous job (7 categories), region (23 regions), duration of af-
¯liation to the unemployment insurance system, unemployment bene¯ts, wage in
the previous job and a dummy equal to one if the occupation in the job searched
is the same as the one in the previous job. In addition to these controls, we use
the longitudinal dimension of our data to control for individual unemployment
and training histories.
The ¯rst step is the estimation of the propensity score. We consider a simple
proportional hazard model and leave more elaborate estimators to future research.
The duration dependence of the hazard function is chosen as a piecewise constant
7function. We allow for 11 cutting points regularly distributed over the interval
[0;18 months]. Heterogeneity is captured by the single-index X¯. We also add an
additional unobserved heterogeneity term, which is modelled as a multiplicative
binary variable. The score function b s(X) is simply the product Xb ¯.
For the second step, we de¯ne cells in the treatment and control groups based
on the 24 percentiles of the distribution of the score in the treatment group. We
then proceed as explained in Section 2.3.
3.2 Results
We ¯rst consider basic estimators for various treatment dates. The time unit is
the month. The upper panel of Figure 1 shows the treatment e®ect on the treated
(remember that a positive e®ect means longer unemployment). The dashed lines
delimit the con¯dence interval obtained by bootstrapping. We consider two treat-
ment dates: ts = 3 and ts = 9.
The ¯gures clearly show that the e®ect at these two treatment dates have the
same pattern. There is ¯rst a locking in period that lasts around 18 months.
The e®ect is important as the survival rate can increase by 10%. After this
locking in period, the e®ect of training on survival is negative. However the
e®ect is small (around 2% three years after entry) and signi¯cant only for ts =
3. The overall picture is therefore close to what was already pointed out in
numerous studies: training the unemployed does not substantially shorten their
unemployment spells.





¯ts1 · Ts · ts2;Tu(Ts) > Ts
¤
for treatment dates ranging from ts1 = 1 to ts2 = 6 and from ts1 = 7 to ts2 = 12.
To do this we estimate the basic parameters for each date and we average them
using the distribution of the treatment date. The lower panel of Figure 1 presents
results for the e®ect of treatment on the treated either when treatment starts
within the six ¯rst months of the unemployment spell or when it starts within
the next six months. Implementing these aggregated parameters does not change
the overall picture about the e®ect of the policy. Training reduces the survival rate
on unemployment only in the long run and the e®ect is small. There are sizable
e±ciency gains to consider aggregated parameters. These gains are su±ciently
8large for the e®ect in the long run to be signi¯cant when entry into treatments
occurs late in the unemployment spell.
Figure 1: Estimated treatment e®ect on the treated on the survival function
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There are two main di®erences between our dynamic matching method and
the standard matching approach. The ¯rst one is related to exits: in our setting
we only count exits without censoring, while the standard matching method also
includes them. More importantly, the second di®erence lies in the de¯nition of
the risk sets (and thus of exits). To ¯x ideas, let RS
¿ (ts) be the risk set at date
¿ + ts for individuals with treatment status S = 0;1, for the treatment date ts.
Let XS
¿ (ts) be the corresponding set of exits from unemployment (so that the
hazard rate can be estimated as X=R) and assume exogenous censoring away for
simplicity. We have:
Dynamic Matching Standard Matching
R0
¿(ts) = fTu(1) ¸ ts + ¿;Ts > ts + ¿g R0
¿(ts) = fmin(Tu(1);Tu(Ts)) ¸ ts + ¿;Ts > tsg
R1
¿(ts) = fTu(ts) ¸ ts + ¿;Ts = tsg R1
¿(ts) = fTu(ts) ¸ ts + ¿;Ts = tsg
X0
¿(ts) = fTu(1) = ts + ¿;Ts > ts + ¿g X0
¿(ts) = fmin(Tu(1);Tu(Ts)) = ts + ¿;Ts > tsg
X1
¿(ts) = fTu(ts) = ts + ¿;Ts = tsg X1
¿(ts) = fTu(ts) = ts + ¿;Ts = tsg
9Looking at the two de¯nitions of R0 and X0, one can see that the standard
matching approach includes in the control group individuals who can enter treat-
ment between ts and ¿ +ts (contamination e®ect). To measure the extend of this
latter e®ect we estimate a contamination rate at each date t, de¯ned as the ratio
between the number of individuals that will be treated strictly after t and the
number of individual still unemployed at t and not yet treated. Figure 2 shows
this contamination rate as a function of t.
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solid line: whole sample, dashed/dotted line: keeping 25%/10% of the non treated.
We see that contamination is small and declining over time. It starts at
8% and goes down to 5% after 12 months. In order to study the incidence of
contamination on estimated survival functions, we also show in Figure 2 the
results using arti¯cial samples including all spells with treatment but only either
25% or 10% of treated spells without treatment. In both cases, the contamination
is much stronger and remains decreasing with respect to the duration before
treatment.
Figure 3 shows the bias of the estimated treatment e®ects TTG(ts) for ts = 3
and ts = 9, and for three samples. We ¯rst see that the bias in the whole sample
is small. It is always negative and less than .5%. However when considering
arti¯cial samples with only 10% or 25% of the spells without treatment, the
biases become more important. It would be even more important if the policy
had a stronger e®ect.
10Figure 3: Bias of standard matching methods
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solid line: whole sample, dashed/dotted line: keeping 25%/10% of the non treated.
4 Conclusion
We propose a methodological foundation for the use of matching techniques in
the cases of dynamic assignment. We ¯rst emphasize the importance of the no
anticipation assumption in de¯ning a counterfactual and thus relevant treatment
parameters. We then show that these parameters are identi¯ed using a typi-
cal conditional independence assumption on potential durations. We apply our
method to training programs in France and detail the implementation of our esti-
mate. We ¯nd that the contamination bias is small in our data. However, since a
few individuals enter training, the contamination rate is itself small. When using
arti¯cial samples in which the contamination rates are higher we ¯nd substantial
di®erences between our method and the standard matching approach. In this
paper, we only consider one treatment and one duration. It could be interesting
to extend our estimators to multiple treatments and outcomes.
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